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INTRODUCTION 
In 1919, in the landmark corporate law case of Dodge v. Ford 
Motors Co.,1 the Michigan Supreme Court held that “[a] business 
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the 
stockholders” and that “the powers of the directors are to be 
employed for that end.”2 This “traditionalist” holding was in line with 
all of the states’ interpretations of corporate law and was part of the 
“property” conception of the corporation, which was the prevailing 
interpretation of the corporate model in the United States at the turn 
of the twentieth century.3 However, since 1919, states have begun to 
acknowledge both the social advantages of considering the well-being 
of constituents other than shareholders in the corporate decision-
making process and the inefficiencies that can result when corporate 
boards are forced to make decisions based solely on profit 
maximization.4 
Acknowledging these twin advantages has led many states to 
pass constituency statutes and other socially progressive corporate 
legislation that allow for-profit corporations to account for the impact 
a particular business decision will have on those with non-ownership 
interests in the company.5 Of course, these statutes do not change the 
fundamental goals of corporations to make a profit and to provide 
their shareholders with high investment returns; instead, these 
statutes simply acknowledge that investors are not the only parties 
affected by the corporation’s business dealings. Thus, constituency 
statutes allow directors to make decisions based on goals other than 
maximizing shareholder profits.6 
This Comment will discuss the many advantages of adopting 
constituency statutes and benefit corporation acts and will advocate 
for North Carolina’s adoption of a new conception of the corporation. 
Analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses the rationale behind 
 
 1. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
 2. Id. at 684. 
 3. See First Union Corp. v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., No. 01-CVS-11075, 2001 WL 
1885686, at *2 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 2001) (quoting William T. Allen, Our 
Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 264–65 
(1992) (discussing the traditional “property” conception of the corporation that views a 
corporation as “the private property of its stockholder-owners” whose “purpose is to 
advance the purposes of these owners (predominantly to increase their wealth)” and 
whose directors’ function “is faithfully to advance the financial interests of the owners”)). 
 4. See discussion infra Sections I.E, II.C. 
 5. See Nathan E. Standley, Lessons Learned from the Capitulation of the 
Constituency Statute, 4 ELON L. REV. 209, 209 (2012). 
 6. See Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, A Statutory Model for Corporate 
Constituency Concerns, 49 EMORY L.J. 1085, 1102 (2000). 
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constituency statutes, examines different constituency statutes in 
existence today, and explains why the benefits of constituency 
statutes far outweigh their drawbacks. Part II introduces the other 
major type of socially progressive corporate legislation: benefit 
corporation acts. This Part highlights the main advantages of the new 
type of business organization those acts allow. Part III considers 
several North Carolina cases that have dealt with the corporate-
conception conflict and discusses the North Carolina legislature’s 
recent failed attempt to allow benefit corporations in the state. 
Finally, Part IV advocates for North Carolina’s ratification of a 
benefit corporation act and argues that the state should supplement 
this act with a permissive constituency statute applicable to all non-
benefit corporations. 
I.  CONSTITUENCY STATUTES 
A. Historical Background and Development of Constituency Statutes 
Although the conflict over how to interpret corporate theory 
dates back to the nineteenth century, it was not until the 1930s that 
the debate garnered national attention.7 At the forefront of this legal 
debate were two prominent Ivy League law professors, Adolf Berle of 
Columbia Law School and Merrick Dodd of Harvard Law School.8 
The two professors had fundamentally different views on the general 
purpose of the corporation and the accompanying duties that the 
directors of a corporation owed to a corporation’s shareholders.9 
Berle strongly believed that a corporation was to be viewed as 
the property of those with ownership interests in it and that the 
directors of a corporation owed shareholders a fiduciary duty to 
secure for them the highest possible return on their investment.10 
Berle’s approach, known as the “traditionalist” theory, “urged the 
primacy of shareholder interests” and concluded that the structure of 
a corporation demanded that the board focus exclusively on 
increasing shareholder wealth.11 In Berle’s mind, consideration of 
nonshareholder interests was a direct conflict of interest and 
 
 7. Id. at 1090. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See id. 
 10 Id. (“Berle and other traditionalists urged primacy of shareholder interests 
because shareholders are traditionally the parties to which directors and officers owe a 
fiduciary duty to return their initial investment.”). 
 11. Id. 
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constituted a breach of a director’s fiduciary duties.12 Berle’s 
traditionalist theory would eventually evolve into the modern day 
“shareholder primacy” model, which adheres to the notion that the 
“best interests of the corporation [are] synonymous with [the] best 
interests of the shareholders” even when the maximization of such 
interest is to the detriment of other constituents’ wellbeing.13 
On the other hand, Dodd advocated for the “constructionist 
theory,” which “urged consideration of the interests of various 
corporate constituents, including both shareholders and 
stakeholders.”14 According to the constructionist theory, a 
corporation is not merely the property of its shareholders but is a 
community entity that “consists of many individuals with a stake in 
the firm’s welfare.”15 Among the nonshareholder constituents that 
Dodd identified were “employees, suppliers, and creditors, and the 
general public.”16 Because constructionists do not view a corporation 
as the property of its shareholders, they do not interpret the 
corporate model as imposing an absolute obligation on its directors to 
maximize shareholder profits when doing so would harm other 
stakeholders.17 
The debate between the traditionalists and constructionists 
peaked in the 1980s as the corporate world experienced a wave of 
hostile takeovers.18 These hostile takeovers presented dilemmas for 
the boards of target companies, who were faced with a conflict 
between shareholders’ short-term interests in profit maximization and 
the best long-term interests of the corporation.19 Although the boards 
 
 12. Id. (“Because a conflict of interest arises when directors and officers consider 
interests other than those of shareholders, the traditionalist viewpoint demands that only 
one group’s interests—the shareholders—constitute the focus of director 
decisionmaking.”). 
 13. Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 
61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14, 90 (1992). Constituents affected by the shareholder primacy 
model include groups like employees, creditors, suppliers, vendors, and the surrounding 
community at large, all of whom are affected by a corporation’s actions despite the fact 
that they are not necessarily financially invested in the company. Adams & Matheson, 
supra note 6, at 1105. 
 14. Adams & Matheson, supra note 6, at 1090. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See id. 
 18. Standley, supra note 5, at 211; see also Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 
Takeovers in the ‘60s and the ‘80s: Evidence and Implications, 12 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 51, 53 
(1991), http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/shleifer/files/takeovers_60s_80s.pdf [http://perma.cc
/C2L5-QUGA] (“Of the 1980 Fortune 500 companies, at least 143, or 28 percent, were 
acquired by 1989.”). 
 19. Thomas J. Bamonte, The Meaning of the “Corporate Constituency” Provision of 
the Illinois Business Corporation Act, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 3 (1995). 
94 N.C. L. REV. 686 (2016) 
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were technically required to allow the mergers under the traditionalist 
corporate theory (because doing so would produce the highest profit 
for stakeholders), in many cases directors feared that allowing 
mergers would be detrimental to the corporation’s vested long-term 
interests.20 
With these potential consequences in mind, directors of target 
corporations were left “scrambling to find ways to fend off hostile 
bidders without breaching the fiduciary duties they owed to 
shareholders.”21 These pressures forced incumbent directors of many 
large takeover target companies, wary of their rapidly diminishing job 
stability, to turn to state legislatures for help.22 State legislatures 
responded by expediting formidable anti-takeover legislation 
packages meant to equip directors with the necessary tools to resist 
impending hostile takeovers.23 At the forefront of many of these 
director-friendly packages were corporate constituency statutes.24 
In 1983, Pennsylvania enacted the first corporate constituency 
statute.25 At the time the bill was being considered, two of 
Pennsylvania’s major corporations, Scott Paper Company and Gulf 
Oil Corporation, each faced a potential hostile takeover and a proxy 
contest.26 The companies leveraged the state legislature by 
threatening to move elsewhere if the corporate constituency 
legislation was not passed—pressure that likely played a role in the 
statute’s expedited ratification.27 However, the statute’s passage was 
also part of a broader, concerted effort to protect the state economy 
and labor force by offering an array of laws and takeover defense 
 
 20. See id. at 3–4 (explaining that a corporation’s “long-term interests include the 
interests of labor, creditors, suppliers, and other local community ‘constituents’ integral to 
the success of the corporation”).  
 21. Anthony Bisconti, The Double Bottom Line: Can Constituency Statutes Protect 
Socially Responsible Corporations Stuck in Revlon Land?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 765, 781 
(2009). 
 22. See Bamonte, supra note 19, at 7. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Sarah S. Nickerson, Comment, The Sale of Conrail: Pennsylvania’s Anti-Takeover 
Statutes Versus Shareholder Interests, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1369, 1372 (1998); Standley, supra 
note 5, at 212.  
 26. Nickerson, supra note 25, at 1372–73. Also known as a proxy fight, a proxy contest 
is “[a] struggle between two corporate factions to obtain the votes of uncommitted 
shareholders” that “[usually] occurs when a group of dissident shareholders mounts a 
battle against the corporation’s [current] managers.” Proxy Contest, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
 27. See Nickerson, supra note 25, at 1372–73.  
94 N.C. L. REV. 686 (2016) 
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mechanisms that would encourage corporations to remain in 
Pennsylvania.28 
Many other states have since followed suit by passing their own 
corporate-friendly constituency statutes modeled after 
Pennsylvania’s.29 Forty-one states currently have some form of a 
constituency statute.30 Though these statutes vary in form and scope, 
“the unifying principle common to all constituency statutes is that 
they enable corporate directors to consider interests other than those 
of their shareholders when exercising their corporate decision-making 
authority.”31 A constituency statute often contains the provisions such 
as: 
1. The board of directors of a corporation may consider the 
interests and effects of any action upon nonshareholders. 
2. The relevant nonshareholder groups include employees, 
suppliers, customers, creditors, and communities. 
3. The directors may consider both long-term and short-term 
interests of the corporation. 
4. The directors may consider local and national economies. 
5. The directors may consider any other relevant social 
factors.32  
Though interpretation and application of these constituency 
statutes has sometimes caused debate among legal scholars, there are 
four commonly agreed-upon principles for the interpretation of 
constituency statutes: (1) the statutes are permissive; they allow 
directors to consider the interests of constituents other than 
shareholders, but do not require them to do so; (2) the statutes 
emphasize serving the best interests of the corporation rather than 
shareholder wealth maximization; (3) the majority of the statutes 
apply regardless of whether times are calm or the corporation finds 
itself in the midst of a takeover attempt, when corporate control is at 
stake; and (4) the statutes fail to expressly vest any legally 
enforceable rights or remedies in nonshareholder constituents, and 
 
 28. See id. at 1373. 
 29. Orts, supra note 13, at 27. 
 30. Kathleen Hale, Corporate Law and Stakeholders: Moving Beyond Stakeholder 
Statutes, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 823, 833 (2003); Standley, supra note 5, at 212. 
 31. Bisconti, supra note 21, at 781–82. 
 32. Id. at 782 (citing various state constituency statutes). 
94 N.C. L. REV. 686 (2016) 
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thus, the nonshareholder constituents have no means of legal redress 
if directors seemingly fail to consider their interests when making a 
particular business decision.33 Aside from these core elements, 
legislatures have tailored the statutes’ terms and scope to satisfy the 
particular state’s objectives.34 
B. Types of Constituency Statutes 
All constituency statutes can be categorized as one of four 
distinct types.35 The first category is a permissive statute that covers 
all corporate decisions.36 Pennsylvania’s statute serves as a good 
example; its key provisions read as follows: 
(a)	General rule.--In discharging the duties of their respective 
positions, the board of directors, committees of the board and 
individual directors of a business corporation may, in 
considering the best interests of the corporation, consider to the 
extent they deem appropriate: 
(1)	The effects of any action upon any or all groups affected 
by such action, including shareholders, employees, suppliers, 
customers and creditors of the corporation, and upon 
communities in which offices or other establishments of the 
corporation are located. 
(2)	The short-term and long-term interests of the 
corporation, including benefits that may accrue to the 
corporation from its long-term plans and the possibility that 
these interests may be best served by the continued 
independence of the corporation. 
(3)	The resources, intent and conduct (past, stated and 
potential) of any person seeking to acquire control of the 
corporation. 
(4)	All other pertinent factors.37 
The Pennsylvania statute is permissive because it permits but does 
not require directors of Pennsylvania corporations to consider the 
effect a decision would have on nonshareholders.38 The term “may” 
 
 33. Bamonte, supra note 19, at 7. 
 34. See Standley, supra note 5, at 213. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. 15 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §	1715(a) (West 2015). 
 38. See id. (using a permissive “may” rather than a mandatory “shall”). 
94 N.C. L. REV. 686 (2016) 
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indicates legislative intent to permit boards of directors to consider 
other constituents at their discretion without requiring them to do so 
for every business decision.39 Furthermore, the absence of language to 
the contrary indicates that the statute was meant to apply to all 
business decisions, not just those relating to hostile takeovers.40 This 
type of constituency statute is therefore the broadest in its application 
and allows for the maximum amount of director discretion.41 
The second type of constituency statute, like Illinois’s, takes a 
different approach to the constituency problem. Rather than merely 
empowering corporate boards to take nonshareholders into 
consideration, this type of statute actually declares that a 
corporation’s interests, which include the interests of a corporation’s 
subsidiaries, should take priority over individual shareholders’ 
interests.42 Illinois’s statute reads as follows: 
In discharging the duties of their respective positions, the board 
of directors, committees of the board, individual directors and 
individual officers may, in considering the best long term and 
short term interests of the corporation, consider the effects of 
any action (including without limitation, action which may 
involve or relate to a change or potential change in control of 
the corporation) upon employees, suppliers and customers of 
the corporation or its subsidiaries, communities in which offices 
or other establishments of the corporation or its subsidiaries are 
located, and all other pertinent factors.43 
This type of statute clearly establishes that it is not a 
corporation’s shareholders to whom the directors owe a primary 
fiduciary duty.44 In doing so, the statute rejects the shareholder 
primacy approach, instead providing that the directors owe a primary 
duty to promote the well-being of all “pertinent” stakeholders 
involved by acting in the best interest of the corporation as a whole.45 
 
 39. See Standley, supra note 5, at 213–14 (characterizing the language of the 
Pennsylvania statute as “permissive, not mandatory”). 
 40. Id. 
 41. See In re Total Containment, Inc., 335 B.R. 589, 606 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2005) 
(holding that a corporation’s directors will be protected by the business judgment rule so 
long as they have not acted in “fraud, bad faith, or self-interest”). “The business judgment 
rule is a judicially created doctrine that protects directors from personal civil liability for 
the decisions they make on behalf of a corporation.” Lori McMillan, The Business 
Judgment Rule as an Immunity Doctrine, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 521, 521 (2013). 
 42. Standley, supra note 5, at 213. 
 43. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8.85 (LEXIS through Pub. Act 99-220 of the 2015 
Leg. Sess.). 
 44. Standley, supra note 5, at 214. 
 45. Bamonte, supra note 19, at 8. 
94 N.C. L. REV. 686 (2016) 
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By allowing Illinois directors to view the corporation as a community 
entity, instead of as the property of corporate shareholders, the 
legislature adopted the constructionist theory of corporate 
conceptualization, thus providing for the well-being of those 
stakeholders who have made nonfinancial investments in the 
company.46 
The third type of constituency statute is a permissive statute that 
only applies to decisions related to hostile takeovers.47 For example, 
Oregon’s statute reads as follows: 
When evaluating any offer of another party to make a tender or 
exchange offer for any equity security of the corporation, or 
any proposal to merge or consolidate the corporation with 
another corporation or to purchase or otherwise acquire all or 
substantially all the properties and assets of the corporation, the 
directors of the corporation may, in determining what they 
believe to be in the best interests of the corporation, give due 
consideration to the social, legal and economic effects on 
employees, customers and suppliers of the corporation and on 
the communities and geographical areas in which the 
corporation and its subsidiaries operate, the economy of the 
state and nation, the long-term as well as short-term interests of 
the corporation and its shareholders, including the possibility 
that these interests may be best served by the continued 
independence of the corporation, and other relevant factors.48 
This type of statute, which has also been adopted by several other 
states,49 is similar to the first two types of constituency statutes in that 
it is permissive. Yet, this type of statute is simultaneously unique 
because it limits its permissive nature to decisions made by directors 
in light of a potential hostile takeover.50 In fact, the Oregon 
legislature further underscored this statutory limitation to hostile 
 
 46. See First Union Corp. v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., No. 01-CVS-10075, 2001 WL 
1885686, at *5 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 2001) (discussing the Illinois constituency statute, 
which “specifically authorize[s] directors to consider the interests of corporate constituents 
other than shareholders when responding to a hostile takeover,	.	.	.	adjust[ing] the balance 
of power between shareholders and other corporate constituents”). 
 47. Standley, supra note 5, at 213. A hostile takeover is “[t]he acquisition of 
ownership or control of a corporation,” which is “typically accomplished by the purchase 
of shares or assets, a tender offer, or a merger,” and “is resisted by the target corporation.” 
Hostile Takeover, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 48. OR. REV. STAT. §	60.357(5) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.). 
 49. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. §	491.101B (West 2015); MO. ANN. STAT. §	351.347 
(West 2015); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §	7-5.2-8 (West 2015); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §	47-33-4 
(2015). 
 50. See Standley, supra note 5, at 215. 
94 N.C. L. REV. 686 (2016) 
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takeover contexts by rejecting a house bill that proposed the statute’s 
expansion to all corporate decisions in 2009.51 Because a wave of 
hostile takeovers brought these constituent-interest issues to light and 
prompted states to begin enacting constituency statutes in the first 
place, states enacting these types of constituency statutes tend to limit 
their statutes to hostile takeover situations.52 Although these statutes 
stringently protect the interests of most stakeholders, they often fail 
to provide for community and environmental interests, which can be 
affected more by day-to-day decisions than by decisions made in 
response to hostile takeover attempts.53 
The final type of constituency statute is a formally mandatory 
statute.54 Connecticut was the only state to enact this type of statute, 
but even the Connecticut statute was amended in 2010 and is now 
permissive.55 Prior to the 2010 amendment, the relevant portion of the 
Connecticut statute read as follows: 
(d) For purposes of sections 33-817, 33-830, 33-831, 33-841	and	
33-844, a director of a corporation	.	.	.	shall consider, in 
determining what he reasonably believes to be in the best 
interests of the corporation, (1) the long-term as well as the 
short-term interests of the corporation, (2) the interests of the 
shareholders, long-term as well as short-term, including the 
possibility that those interests may be best served by the 
 
 51. H.R. 2829, 75th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009); see also Standley, supra 
note 5, at 215. 
 52. See Standley, supra note 5, at 215. 
 53. By limiting the scope of the constituency statute to hostile takeover situations, the 
harmful environmental effects of a daily practice like toxic dumping may be ignored for the 
sake of shareholder profit maximization. Cf. Judd F. Sneirson, Race to the Left: A Legislator’s 
Guide To Greening a Corporate Code, 88 OR. L. REV. 491, 503 (2009) (“To become a little 
greener, a jurisdiction without an other constituency statute should adopt one, and a 
jurisdiction with an other constituency statute limited to takeover situations should remove 
the limitation.”). For example, Siltronic Corporation, a semiconductor-related manufacturer 
located in Portland, Oregon, discharged 350,562 pounds of chemicals into the Willamette 
River in 2012, accounting for over twenty-five percent of the state’s toxic chemical dumping 
that year. Edward Russo, Siltronic Plant in Portland Dumps the Most Toxics into Oregon 
Rivers, PORTLAND TRIB. (June 20, 2014, 4:35 PM), http://portlandtribune.com/sl/224914-
87113-siltronic-plant-in-portland-dumps-the-most-toxics-into-oregon-rivers [http://perma.cc
/P35Z-AXAE]. While this method of waste disposal is likely a cost-efficient one, it fails to 
consider the detrimental effect that such a practice will inevitably have on the 
environment and the surrounding community. Cf. Benita M. Beamon, Designing the 
Green Supply Chain, 12 LOGISTICS INFO. MGMT. 332, 341 (1999) (“No longer is it 
acceptable or cost effective to consider only the local and immediate effects of products 
and processes; it is now imperative to analyze the entire life-cycle effects of all products 
and processes.”).  
 54. See Standley, supra note 5, at 213. 
 55. Id. at 216.  
94 N.C. L. REV. 686 (2016) 
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continued independence of the corporation, (3) the interests of 
the corporation’s employees, customers, creditors and 
suppliers, and (4) community and societal considerations 
including those of any community in which any office or other 
facility of the corporation is located. A director may also in his 
discretion consider any other factors he reasonably considers 
appropriate in determining what he reasonably believes to be in 
the best interests of the corporation.56 
Under this type of statute, most legal scholars interpreted the word 
“shall” to mean that directors were required, and not merely allowed, 
to consider the interests of nonshareholder constituents that the 
director “reasonably considers appropriate” when making corporate 
decisions.57 Even under this mandatory form, Connecticut’s statute, 
like all other constituency statutes examined in this Part, lacked an 
enforcement mechanism for nonshareholders who wished to protect 
their interests in a legal proceeding.58 Accordingly, even if the statute 
was intended to be mandatory, the absence of an enforcement 
mechanism or legal remedy for constituents immunized directors 
from liability for failure to abide by the statute, thus nullifying the 
very mandate upon which the statute was premised.59 Regardless, the 
Connecticut legislature amended the statute in 2010 by replacing the 
mandatory “shall” with a permissive “may.”60 In doing so, the 
legislature eliminated the only purportedly mandatory constituency 
statute in existence and ended the debate over enforcement of such a 
statute before the courts ever addressed the issue.61 The failure of this 
mandatory statutory construction provides important lessons and 
instructive historical context as North Carolina considers adopting its 
own constituency statute. 
To date, there are still nine states, including North Carolina, that 
have yet to enact any form of a constituency statute.62 Legal scholars 
have proposed two theories as to why these states have not yet 
adopted statutes: (1) “with the exception of Delaware, [the states that 
 
 56. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §	33-756(d) (West 2015) (emphasis added).  
 57. Standley, supra note 5, at 216. Bisconti states that the statute seemed to be an 
explicit challenge to the theory of shareholder primacy, which indicated to both courts and 
directors “that the consideration of nonshareholder interests must be more than just an 
afterthought.” Bisconti, supra note 21, at 798. 
 58. Bisconti, supra note 21, at 783. 
 59. See id. 
 60. Act of May 10, 2015, No. 10-35, §	10(d), 2010 Conn. Acts H.B. 5530 (Reg. Sess.) 
(codified as amended at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §	33-756(d) (West 2015)). 
 61. Standley, supra note 5, at 216. 
 62. Id. at 217. 
94 N.C. L. REV. 686 (2016) 
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have not yet adopted constituency statutes] were not significantly 
impacted by the hostile takeover wave of the 1980s”; and (2) states 
that did not adopt the statutes may have felt that states that did adopt 
statutes “were overreacting by taking unnecessary steps in the face of 
hostile takeovers.”63 Thus, states that have not yet adopted these 
statutes may consider waiting in order to observe the impact 
constituency statutes have on the corporate landscape in states that 
have adopted constituency statutes. 
C. Delaware’s Creation of a Quasi-Constituency Statute at Common 
Law 
Though nearly every state has attempted to protect corporate 
constituents through action by the legislative branch, Delaware, by 
contrast, created a similar doctrine through its judicial branch. While 
Delaware is among the nine states that have not yet formally adopted 
a constituency statute, the state’s corporate law precedent has been 
interpreted as having instead created a common law, quasi-
constituency statute.64 Delaware case law strikes a balance between 
shareholders’ and nonshareholder constituents’ interests by “allowing 
directors to consider the interests of others as long as there is some 
reasonable connection to the long-term interests of the corporation 
and shareholders.”65 This “quasi-constituency statute” was affirmed in 
the landmark case of Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.66 
In Paramount Communications, the Supreme Court of Delaware 
upheld the Time board’s decision to reject a highly profitable tender 
offer by Paramount Communications in favor of a merger with 
Warner Brothers.67 Even though the merger was significantly less 
favorable to Time’s shareholders, Time’s directors felt that the 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 219 (“[T]he Delaware judiciary has aligned its common law to primarily 
conform to constituency statutes.”). 
 65. Id. at 222. Compare Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 
1985) (holding that directors may consider the interests of nonshareholder constituents in 
the face of a possible takeover and are not obligated to approve a combination simply 
because it would result in short-term shareholder profits), with Revlon, Inc. v. 
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 181 (Del. 1986) (holding that when a 
takeover becomes inevitable (i.e. the “Revlon” moment occurs), directors may no longer 
consider nonshareholder interests and are obligated to act as unbiased auctioneers in an 
effort to maximize shareholder profits), and Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 
A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1990) (holding that, provided there is no inevitable impending 
takeover, directors are free to make corporate decisions that may not necessarily 
maximize short-term shareholder profits as long as the decision promotes the long-term 
interests of both shareholders and the corporation in general). 
 66. 571 A.2d 1140, 1152–53 (Del. 1990). 
 67. See id. at 1152–53. 
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Warner deal would provide better long-term benefits for the 
corporation.68 While the powerful precedent set by several of 
Delaware’s constituency cases—and exemplified by Paramount 
Communications—seems to be clear enough to settle the constituency 
debate in Delaware, corporate directors in the other eight states 
(including North Carolina) remain without explicit statutory law to 
guide corporate governance. Because the case law in the area is 
seemingly very limited, corporations in these eight states are left 
guessing as to how a constituency case would play out in their own 
state courts. 
D. Responding to the Primary Arguments Against Constituency 
Statutes 
Despite the fact that forty-one states have already adopted 
constituency statutes, many legal scholars who promote Berle’s 
traditionalist theory still reject the constructionist-based laws, 
claiming such statutes promote an improper conceptualization of the 
corporate model. This Section will address some of the most common 
criticisms of constituency statutes, including arguments that these 
statutes are unconstitutional and claims that they offend public policy. 
1.  Constitutional Arguments Against Constituency Statutes 
Critics of constituency statutes often attack them by challenging 
their constitutionality.69 One constitutional argument against 
constituency statutes is that they violate the Contracts Clause of the 
United States Constitution.70 In order to understand this argument, 
one must conceptualize the modern-day corporation as a “	‘nexus of 
contracts’ involving various constituents, including shareholders, 
directors, managers, and employees.”71 Critics of constituency statutes 
argue that, under this contract-based corporate theory, shareholder 
interests are the “foremost aspect” and that “any state law impairing 
these previously existing contracts	.	.	.	must be declared 
unconstitutional under the Contracts Clause.”72 However, a state’s 
constituency statute only violates the Contracts Clause if it is proven 
 
 68. Adam Winkler, Corporate Law or the Law of Business?: Stakeholders and 
Corporate Governance at the End of History, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2004, at 
109, 123–24 (2004). 
 69. See Adams & Matheson, supra note 6, at 1096. 
 70. Id.; see U.S. CONST. art I, §	10, cl. 1 (forbidding states from passing any “law 
impairing the obligation of contracts”). 
 71. Adams & Matheson, supra note 6, at 1096. 
 72. Id. 
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that the statute caused some loss of investment by retroactively 
impairing an existing contractual relationship.73 Thus, because one 
cannot assume that a corporation in a state governed by a 
constituency statute produces any less profit than a corporation 
operating in a state without a constituency statute, the Contracts 
Clause argument seemingly lacks legal justification.74 
Another constitutional argument against constituency statutes is 
that the consideration of nonshareholders’ rights constitutes a 
“taking,” and thus, a violation of the Fifth Amendment.75 Arguably, 
considering the interests of other parties “constitutes a taking because 
shareholders’ legal claim to the residual interest of the firm is reduced 
by consideration of constituent interest, which reassigns property 
rights from shareholders to stakeholders.”76 However, “constituency 
statutes do not completely strip shareholders of the entire value of 
their stock; they merely limit the preferential treatment of 
shareholder interests.”77 Because legislation that merely “reallocates 
benefits and burdens among private parties” is not considered a 
taking under the Fifth Amendment, it follows that a claim that 
constituency statutes violate the Fifth Amendment cannot be 
sustained.78 
2.  Policy Arguments Against Constituency Statutes 
Traditionalists have also made several public policy arguments 
against constituency statutes. The first such argument is that state 
legislatures only enacted constituency statutes because they were 
pressured to do so by the powerful executives from the states’ largest 
corporations.79 These executives petitioned for the new statutes out of 
 
 73. Id. at 1097. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public 
use, without just compensation.”). 
 76. See Adams & Matheson, supra note 6, at 1097. “Residual interest” refers to an 
equity holder’s property rights in the corporation, which opponents of constituency 
statutes argue are devalued by the consideration of additional constituents’ interests. Id.  
 77. Id. at 1098. In United States v. General Motors Corp., the Supreme Court made it 
clear that whether an action constitutes a taking under the Fifth Amendment depends on 
whether the action deprives the owner of the property, not whether it affects ancillary 
interests associated with such property. See United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 
373, 378 (1945) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment concerns itself solely with the ‘property,’ i.e., 
with the owner’s relation as such to the physical thing and not with other collateral 
interests which may be incident to his ownership.”). 
 78. Al Meyers, Whom May the Corporation Serve?—An Argument for the 
Constitutionality of Non-Stockholder Constituency Statutes, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 449, 
475–76 (1994).  
 79. Adams & Matheson, supra note 6, at 1099. 
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fear that they would lose their jobs should the hostile takeovers of 
their companies succeed.80 Critics argue that by submitting to this 
political pressure, states that passed constituency statutes allowed 
these same officers and directors to “hide behind the law when [their] 
decisions are questioned, making the process one which benefits 
managers instead of the constituents [the statutes] are meant to 
serve.”81 However, while constituency statutes may have ultimately 
resulted in such executives and directors being able to keep the high-
paying positions that they would have lost had a merger succeeded, 
the statutes were likely primarily driven by state legislatures’ desire 
for large corporations to remain incorporated in, or even relocate to, 
the state, thus bolstering the state’s labor force and serving its best 
economic interests.82 
Perhaps the most convincing policy argument against 
constituency statutes is that they lack an enforcement mechanism for 
the constituents they purport to protect.83 None of these statutes 
provide any way for constituents to force directors to consider their 
interests, nor do they allow constituents to challenge director 
decisions that have a detrimental effect on them.84 In fact, some state 
constituency statutes even go so far as to explicitly deny 
nonshareholder constituents such a remedy.85 This means that 
directors often have no choice but to prioritize stockholding 
constituents’ interests to the exclusion of the interests of other 
stakeholders because of the threat of potential legal action by the 
shareholders, who, unlike nonshareholders, do maintain statutorily 
enabled litigation options.86 
Yet the reason constituency statutes lack enforcement rights is 
likely because they are permissive, and not mandatory, in nature.87 
Because constituency statutes merely give directors the option to 
consider nonshareholder constituents’ interests, a court would be 
hard-pressed to find a violation when those directors simply choose 
not to exercise this option.88 Accordingly, states that have passed 
 
 80. See id. 
 81. Id. at 1100. 
 82. See, e.g., supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text. 
 83. See Adams & Matheson, supra note 6, at 1110. 
 84. See id. at 1100–01. 
 85. Standley, supra note 5, at 218; see also GA. CODE ANN. §	14-2-202(b)(5) (2003); 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §	78.138(6) (LEXIS through 2014 Spec. Sess.); N.Y. BUS. CORP. 
LAW §	717(b)(v) (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2015, chapters 1–558). 
 86. Standley, supra note 5, at 218. 
 87. Adams & Matheson, supra note 6, at 1101. 
 88. See id. 
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constituency statutes have effectively done so with the hope that the 
expansion of director capabilities will not be in vain. Because there is 
no way nonshareholder constituents’ interests can be legally enforced, 
the legislatures in states that have passed constituency statutes must 
trust that directors will take it upon themselves to create socially 
conscious corporate governance structures in which all stakeholders’ 
interests are considered.89 While this may be effective to a certain 
extent, a mandatory constituency statute, such as the one this 
Comment advocates for North Carolina to enact, will ensure more 
consistent consideration of stakeholder interests. 
E. Arguments in Favor of Constituency Statutes Outweigh the 
Criticisms 
Several commentators have recognized the need to consider the 
best interests of other important corporate constituents, advocating 
the constructionist corporate model and highlighting the many 
potential benefits of constituency statutes. These proponents 
emphasize several policy arguments relating to the economic 
efficiency and equitable corporate structure that constituency statutes 
promote.90 
First, constituency statutes allow directors to acknowledge the 
importance of constituents who make essential but noncapital 
investments in the company, and to consider their interests when 
making business decisions.91 Though they may not have made 
financial investments in the corporation, nonshareholder constituents, 
like employees, “have made a much greater investment in the 
enterprise by their years of service” and in many cases “may have a 
greater stake in the future of the enterprise than many of the 
stockholders.”92 Because these stakeholders lack the ability to protect 
their noncapital investments in the firm contractually, they need 
access to alternative protections to secure their interests.93 
 
 89. See id. at 1103. 
 90. See, e.g., id. at 1104 (“Constituency statutes allow consideration of those other 
than shareholders who have contributed to a corporation’s success by allowing all 
constituencies to influence the decisions of companies they help operate and depend on 
for financial security.”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency 
Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 971, 995 (1992) (“[D]irectors may balance a decision’s effects on 
shareholders against its effect on stakeholders. If the decision would harm stakeholders, 
the directors may trade-off a reduction in shareholder gains for enhanced stakeholder 
welfare.”). 
 91. Adams and Matheson, supra note 6, at 1102. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 1103–04. 
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Constituency statutes allow directors to balance the concurrent 
interests of shareholders and other stakeholders, thus permitting the 
directors to pursue a course of action that ultimately sacrifices a 
portion of shareholder gains if doing so is necessary to protect the 
noncapital interests of other constituents.94 Allowing directors to 
conduct business in this way helps promote an environment within 
the corporation in which all corporate actors feel “as if they share 
common goals, rather than placing them in selfish competition with 
one another.”95 
The second argument in favor of constituency statutes is that 
these statutes inspire socially responsible behavior and allow 
corporations to uphold their ethical responsibilities, thereby 
encouraging corporations that value these goals to incorporate in, or 
relocate to, the state.96 The general idea is that these companies that 
“do good for society” will also tend to “do well in the market,” thus 
benefitting the state as a whole.97 Because constituency statutes are 
meant to encourage socially responsible corporate behavior, such 
statutes will help states attract ethically and socially responsible 
businesses, which will lead to a more “attractive business climate” and 
benefit the statewide economy.98 
Legal scholars in favor of constituency statutes maintain that 
corporations must become institutions with moral identities that 
recognize and accept their ethical obligation to the many different 
nonshareholder constituents who are integral to a corporation’s 
success.99 In doing so, a corporation must account for the external 
effects of its internal decisions by holding its directors to a high moral 
standard and requiring them to consider all of the relevant interests at 
stake when making a decision.100 Allowing directors to consider these 
 
 94. Bainbridge, supra note 90, at 995. 
 95. Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing 
Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 642–43 (1992) (“[Considering 
stakeholder interests] helps redress the malaise caused by corporate displacement of those 
in the process who have limited, if any, power to participate in or influence that process.”). 
 96. See Bisconti, supra note 21, at 786. 
 97. Virginia Harper Ho, “Enlightened Shareholder Value”: Corporate Governance 
Beyond the Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide, 36 J. CORP. L. 59, 103 n.221 (2010) 
(explaining that empirical studies have revealed a positive correlation between corporate 
social performance and corporate financial performance); see also Marc Orlitzky, 
Corporate Social Performance and Financial Performance: A Research Synthesis, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 113, 127 (Andrew Crane 
et al. eds., 2008) (concluding that corporate citizenship and corporate financial 
performance are mutually reinforcing and positively correlated).  
 98. Bisconti, supra note 21, at 786. 
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 100. See id. at 1109. 
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nonshareholder constituents’ interests helps foster positive relations 
between a business and its community, which is important for both a 
corporation’s financial success and the welfare of the general 
public.101 
Finally, constituency statutes are simply more consistent with the 
modern theory of the corporation.102 According to proponents of 
constituency statutes, modern corporate law has clearly rejected the 
traditionalist theory that the corporation is the sole property of its 
shareholders.103 Instead, modern corporate law views the corporation 
as an interdependent system of personal and economic 
relationships.104 Corporate structure is supported by a “web of 
contracts, explicit and implicit, among a variety of participants: 
stockholders, lenders, employees, managers, suppliers, distributors, 
and customers.”105 Because all of these constituents bear some type of 
residual risk, proponents of constituency statutes argue that directors 
must make decisions based on what is best for society as a whole, not 
just what is best for maximizing shareholder wealth.106 
Taken together, the arguments in favor of constituency statutes 
outweigh those against them. Though the statutes may have originally 
been passed as anti-takeover devices, they have become mediums 
through which corporations can make socially conscious decisions 
that benefit those with financial and nonfinancial investments in the 
company alike.107 
II.  BENEFIT CORPORATION ACTS: ANOTHER TYPE OF 
PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LEGISLATION 
While permissive constituency statutes are the oldest and most 
common type of progressive corporate legislation, more radical 
corporate reforms have also recently taken shape. In the past five 
years alone, a new type of corporate reform legislation has emerged 
 
 101. See id. 
 102. Cf. Mitchell, supra note 95, at 630 (“We have long since passed the point of 
seriously describing the corporation as an anthropomorphic entity, directed in an 
otherwise indeterminate world by the generalized interests of its ‘owners’ in wealth 
maximization. It is obvious that the corporation is far more complex an undertaking, 
consisting of intertwined human and economic relationships, than the traditional 
stockholder-owner model permits.”). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Adams & Matheson, supra note 6, at 1105 (quoting Morey W. McDaniel, 
Stockholders and Stakeholders, 21 STETSON L. REV. 121, 149 (1991)). 
 106. Id. 
 107. See id. at 1109. 
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and begun to catch on in many states: the benefit corporation act.108 
Benefit corporation statutes were likely created in response to the 
common criticism that the permissive nature of constituency statutes 
often results in nonshareholder constituents’ interests being 
ignored.109 By eliminating the permissive element of constituency 
statutes, these more modern benefit corporation statutes have sought 
to solve this problem and to assure that such interests are always 
considered in a corporation’s decision-making process.110 
A. What Is a Benefit Corporation? 
Benefit corporations are a new type of business association 
designed to address the inequity between shareholder and 
stakeholder interests.111 Benefit corporations (1) strive to create a 
corporate purpose that will have a positive impact on both society and 
the environment; (2) are not simply permitted to, but are required to 
consider the impact their business decisions will have on both 
shareholders and all other nonshareholder constituents;112 and (3) are 
required to release an annual report to the public assessing the 
company’s overall social and environmental performance using an 
objective third-party standard.113 While the ultimate goal of benefit 
corporations is still to make money, this type of business association 
enables “[c]ommunity and environmentally minded business owners 
[to] preserve their social goals without sacrificing the ability to make a 
profit.”114 
Although benefit corporations can be viewed as an alternative to 
constituency statutes and some states have chosen to implement 
either one or the other, many states are beginning to enact benefit 
 
 108. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §	5-6C-01 to 5-6C-08 (LEXIS 
through 2015 legislation). 
 109. See James Surowiecki, Companies with Benefits, NEW YORKER (Aug. 4, 2014), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/08/04/companies-benefits [https://perma.cc/9M3K
-VL8Z (dark archive)]. Benefit corporation acts require that directors of those companies 
consider nonshareholder interests rather than simply giving them the option to do so. See 
FAQ, BENEFITCORP.NET, http://benefitcorp.net/faq [http://perma.cc/3FA9-KT4R]. 
 110. See Surowiecki, supra note 109. 
 111. See FAQ, supra note 109. 
 112. Id. This is the primary reason for having benefit corporations even in states that 
already have constituency statutes. “Constituency statutes are permissive and as a result 
directors ‘may’ consider non-financial interests. This also means that they ‘may not’. [sic.] 
The objective of benefit corporation legislation is to require directors to consider non-
financial interests.” Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Doug Bend & Alex King, Why Consider a Benefit Corporation?, FORBES (May 5, 
2014,	9:00	AM),	http://www.forbes.com/sites/theyec/2014/05/30/why-consider-a-benefit-
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94 N.C. L. REV. 686 (2016) 
2015] CORPORATE IDENTITY THEORY 705 
corporation legislation in addition to their pre-existing constituency 
statutes.115 In fact, since Maryland became the first state to adopt a 
benefit corporation act in 2010, twenty-five more states and the 
District of Columbia have passed legislation allowing businesses to 
incorporate as benefit corporations.116 
Whereas the standard corporation is typically allowed to form 
for any lawful purpose, companies organized as benefit corporations 
must “have a purpose of creating ‘general public benefit’ and are 
allowed to identify one or more ‘specific public benefit’ purposes.”117 
For example, Maryland defines a “general public benefit” as a 
“material, positive impact on society and the environment, as 
measured by a third-party standard, through activities that promote a 
combination of some specific public benefits.”118 “Specific public 
benefit” is defined to include the following: 
(1) Providing individuals or communities with beneficial 
products or services; 
(2) Promoting economic opportunity for individuals or 
communities beyond the creation of jobs in the normal course 
of business; 
(3) Preserving the environment; 
(4) Improving human health; 
(5) Promoting the arts, sciences, or advancement of knowledge; 
(6) Increasing the flow of capital to entities with a public benefit 
purpose; or 
(7) The accomplishment of any other particular benefit for 
society or the environment.119 
 
 115. See State by State Status of Legislation, BENEFITCORP.NET, http://benefitcorp.net
/policymakers/state-by-state-status [http://perma.cc/L2VK-KDAY]. To date, thirty-one states 
have passed benefit corporation legislation and five others have introduced bills to adopt 
similar legislation in their states. Id. 
 116. Jacob E. Hasler, Contracting for Good: How Benefit Corporations Empower 
Investors and Redefine Shareholder Value, 100 VA. L. REV. 1279, 1279 & n.1 (2014). 
 117. William H. Clark, Jr. & Elizabeth K. Babson, How Benefit Corporations Are 
Redefining the Purpose of Business Corporations, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 817, 839 
(2012). 
 118. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §	5-6C-01(c) (LEXIS through 2015 
legislation). 
 119. §	5-6C-01(d). 
94 N.C. L. REV. 686 (2016) 
706 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94 
Now that the general structure of the benefit corporation has 
been introduced, the next Section addresses the criticisms and 
advantages most commonly associated with this novel corporate form. 
B. Addressing the Major Criticisms of Benefit Corporation Acts 
Critics of benefit corporations point to three major drawbacks of 
benefit corporation acts.120 First, organizing as a benefit corporation 
leads to a significant increase in administrative costs because of the 
heightened reporting requirements to which benefit corporations are 
subjected.121 The relatively extensive reporting requirements are 
exemplified by the Maryland Benefit Corporation Act, which requires 
all benefit corporations to: (1) prepare an annual report assessing the 
company’s societal and environmental performance over the past 
year; (2) promptly deliver the report to each stockholder at the close 
of the fiscal year; and (3) either post the most recent report on the 
company’s publicly accessible website or provide a copy of the most 
recent report on demand and without charge to any person who 
requests it.122 The expenses associated with these reporting 
requirements could be a deterrent for potential investors in a publicly 
traded benefit corporation, particularly if the company is forced to 
pass these administrative costs along to the shareholders in the form 
of lower dividends. 
Second, because benefit corporations have only been in existence 
since 2010, another major concern is that the model has not yet 
proven to be effective.123 Benefit corporations’ increased emphasis on 
social responsibility and their somewhat decreased emphasis on 
maximizing shareholder returns has critics wondering whether 
investors will ultimately be willing to sacrifice a portion of their 
would-be profits for the greater social good.124 Some experts argue 
 
 120. See Bend & King, supra note 114.  
 121. See id. (“One of the major drawbacks is expanded reporting requirements. This is 
to provide shareholders with adequate information to determine if your business is 
achieving its stated purpose. Each year a benefit corporation must give each shareholder 
an annual report.”). 
 122. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §	5-6C-08. 
 123. See Bend & King, supra note 114 (“Another potential drawback is uncertainty. 
Benefit corporations are fairly new legal entities. It is unclear how courts will interpret 
their mandates to not only seek profits, but also to consider potential benefits to society. 
Furthermore, the impact on raising capital and how angel investors and venture capitalists 
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 124. See Justin Blount & Kwabena Offei-Danso, The Benefit Corporation: A 
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that the mandatory general benefit purpose clause creates such a 
concern in potential investors and that this concern may cause them 
to invest in traditional business corporations instead.125 Specifically, 
Justin Blount, a Professor of Business Law at Stephen F. Austin 
University, and Kwabena Offei-Danso, an in-house corporate 
attorney, have questioned the economic sustainability of benefit 
corporations, stating that when 
investors face the opportunity to invest in a benefit corporation 
that articulates its primary purpose as the creation of a general 
public benefit or, on the other hand, a socially minded business 
corporation that embraces a profit goal via a socially 
responsible business plan, the latter is more likely to receive 
capital.126 
Even those who advocate “socially responsible investments,” 
such as companies incorporated as benefit corporations, concede that 
many socially conscious investors still invest with the primary goal of 
making a return.127 Thus, although this aspect of benefit corporations 
suggests that most multi-billion dollar companies with extremely 
wealthy institutional investors are unlikely to re-organize as benefit 
corporations, the business form may be an attractive option for 
companies with investors who are interested in turning a profit but 
are also committed to investing in a company that places a premium 
on social responsibility. 
The last major criticism of benefit corporation acts is a 
procedural one. Critics point out that although benefit corporations 
require directors to consider the interests of nonshareholder 
constituents, benefit corporation acts, like constituency statutes, fail 
to provide these nonshareholder constituents with a mechanism to 
enforce their rights.128 Legislatures in states with benefit corporation 
acts have likely left such enforcement provisions out of their statutes 
to avoid “the difficult and inefficient judicial problem that would 
develop if the benefit corporation were subject to suit by any of the 
stakeholders whose interests they are required to consider.”129 
Because nonshareholder constituents are left without remedy, critics 
believe the benefit corporation “falls short of being a true 
 
commonly taught in business schools—that the purpose of the corporation is to maximize 
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 125. Id. at 657–58. 
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stakeholder-centric model” because the company cannot be held 
accountable by the very parties the corporate form is meant to 
protect.130 However, while the statutes do not provide nonshareholder 
constituents with a right of enforcement, such a right is available to 
shareholders, who may bring a claim against a benefit corporation’s 
directors for failure to uphold the company’s stated general or 
specific public benefit purposes.131 Furthermore, it seems likely that 
those who would be willing to invest in benefit corporations would 
also be inclined to hold such companies accountable and ensure that 
nonshareholder constituents’ interests are properly considered.132 
C. Benefit Corporations’ Numerous Socioeconomic Advantages 
Offset Their Potential Drawbacks 
The first major advantage of benefit corporation acts is that they 
require companies organized as benefit corporations to adhere to the 
higher social standards created by their general and specific benefit 
purposes, regardless of circumstances.133 A benefit corporation is able 
to ensure it will uphold its beneficial purposes because directors are 
afforded “secured legal protection necessary to consider the interests 
of all stakeholders” and shareholders are provided with ample means 
of enforcement.134 Shareholders may enforce director compliance in 
several ways: They may (1) seek an injunction by initiating a benefit 
enforcement proceeding; (2) engage in a proxy contest; and (3) vote 
for terms in the entity’s governing documents that require routine 
auditing of directors’ actions.135 Though similar means of enforcement 
are available in the traditional corporation as well, social investors in 
benefit corporations are much more likely to hold directors 
accountable for a deviation from the company’s general or specific 
beneficial purposes “because their stock purchase was conditioned on 
a promise that directors would act in a socially responsible 
manner.”136 
 
 130. Id. at 648–49. 
 131. Surowiecki, supra note 109 (“Shareholders can sue [a benefit corporation’s] 
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Another advantage of benefit corporation acts is that they 
insulate directors of benefit corporations from investor pressure.137 
Because shareholders are but one of the many constituent groups 
whose interests must be considered by benefit corporations, directors 
need not fear for their jobs every time they make a socially 
responsible decision that may marginally decrease shareholder 
profits; doing so is simply part of their fiduciary duty.138 This prevents 
directors from being forced into solely monetary-based decisions. For 
instance, in 2000, the Ben & Jerry’s board of directors strongly 
opposed the acquisition of their company by Unilever from a social 
standpoint but nonetheless felt bound by their fiduciary duty to the 
shareholders to approve the acquisition.139 However, if Ben & Jerry’s 
had been organized as a benefit corporation, the directors would not 
have owed the shareholders any such duty. The directors would have 
been free to oppose the combination for legitimate social reasons 
despite the fact that doing so may have deprived the shareholders of 
the highest possible profit. 
The final advantage of benefit corporations is that they appeal to 
young, talented employees who are part of an increasingly socially 
conscious generation and who are seeking to start their careers at 
companies with similar values.140 In fact many young employees are 
even willing to “take less compensation in exchange for a greater 
sense of purpose.”141 If benefit corporations are able to attract and 
retain this type of top-tier talent, their efficiency will increase and 
they will be able to stay true to their beneficial and charitable 
purposes while still managing to turn a healthy profit.142 
In sum, benefit corporations have become a popular alternative 
for new and existing companies that do not wish to conform to the 
traditionalist view of the corporation.143 By voluntarily holding 
themselves to a higher social standard, these companies are able to 
recognize the needs of all those whose interests the corporation 
affects.144 This progressive business model in turn attracts qualified 
young minds and socially conscious investors who support the 
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company’s noble goals.145 The ultimate result can be a more efficient 
company that is able to turn a healthy profit while making meaningful 
societal contributions, satisfying all of its constituents. 
III.  HOW NORTH CAROLINA HAS DEALT WITH THE CORPORATE 
THEORY CONFLICT 
A. Lack of North Carolina Case Law on the Issue 
Unlike Delaware, North Carolina case law does not create a 
quasi-constituency statute or address the question of whether 
nonshareholder constituents may be considered in a corporation’s 
decision-making process.146 However, North Carolina courts have 
acknowledged the existence and importance of the conflict between 
different constituents’ interests, thus reinforcing the argument that 
North Carolina could benefit from legislation that expressly defines 
the scope of director discretion.147 
In 1983, the Supreme Court of North Carolina handed down 
perhaps the most definitive rule available on the corporate theory 
conflict in the state. In Meiselman v. Meiselman,148 the court asserted 
that directors of corporations, “[w]hile technically not 
trustees	.	.	.	stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its 
stockholders.”149 By conceptualizing directors as “quasi-trustees,” the 
court seems to endorse the traditionalist, property-based theory of 
corporate identity.150 The opinion suggests that the corporation is to 
be viewed as the “property” of its investors and the directors, as 
“quasi-trustees,” are to manage the business accordingly.151 Though 
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 146. See Standley, supra note 5, at 217, 221–23. 
 147. See, e.g., Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 288–96, 307 S.E.2d 551, 557–61 
(1983). 
 148. 309 N.C. 279, 307 S.E.2d 551 (1983). 
 149. Id. at 308, 307 S.E.2d at 568 (quoting Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939)). 
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the courts of several other states have disputed the ruling in this case, 
Meiselman has yet to be overturned by the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina.152 
In First Union Corp. v. SunTrust Banks, Inc.,153 the Superior 
Court of Guilford County, North Carolina, identified the lack of 
clarity in corporate identity theory as a major hindrance to effective 
application of North Carolina corporate law.154 In doing so, the court 
acknowledged that the two opposing theories of corporate identity 
always have been, and will continue to be, at the root of most intra-
corporation conflict.155 Because corporations “exist to create value,” 
and producing profits or creating nonfinancial, external gains can 
create such value, it is important that directors have a clear sense of 
how they are permitted to run a corporation and which values they 
are permitted to foster.156 
B. North Carolina Legislature’s Rejection of the Benefit Corporation 
Act 
Perhaps in response to North Carolina courts expressing a need 
for clarity as to the bounds of directors’ duties, the state’s general 
assembly recently considered instituting a benefit corporation act.157 
In February of 2013, the North Carolina Senate proposed and passed 
a bill to ratify the North Carolina Benefit Corporation Act.158 The bill 
was then promptly filed in the house of representatives and, after 
being referred to several committees, was ultimately rejected by a 
 
knowledge of human characteristics and motives, has established a rule that demands of a 
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Corporation Act, N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY, http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/gascripts/BillLookUp
/BillLookUp.pl?Session=2013&BillID=S99 [http://perma.cc/R2DR-457E]. 
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count of sixty to fifty-two.159 The terms of the North Carolina Benefit 
Corporation Act proposed by the bill were very similar to those in the 
statutes of other states that allow benefit corporations.160 The Act 
would have required that a business incorporated as a benefit 
corporation “have as one of its corporate purposes the creation of a 
general public benefit” and would have required the directors of 
benefit corporations to consider the financial, social, and 
environmental impact of a potential business decision.161 
Though two Republican representatives sponsored the bill, the 
vast majority of the Republicans in the house of representatives voted 
against it.162 The “no” votes from the Republican majority were 
ultimately enough to overcome the nearly unanimous Democratic 
support of the bill.163 Those who opposed the bill were concerned that 
“its goal [was] to move the corporate system and capitalism in general 
toward socialism by suggesting that there’s a higher, better purpose 
than maximizing profit.”164 However, the bill’s sponsor, 
Representative McGrady (R-Henderson County), and other 
supporters explained that there was no socialist agenda and that the 
proposed act was simply meant to recognize the aspirations of the 
socially conscious younger generation, who “want to make a profit,” 
but also want to “be about good things.”165 
C. Possible Explanations for North Carolina’s Failure To Adopt 
Either Type of Statute 
There are several possible explanations for why North Carolina’s 
General Assembly has not yet chosen to adopt either major type of 
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progressive corporate law reform. The first is that, unlike many of the 
states that rushed to adopt constituency statutes, North Carolina was 
not significantly impacted by the 1980s wave of hostile takeovers that 
sparked many other states to pass those statutes.166 This argument is 
substantiated by both the general nature of the 1980s takeover trend 
and the landscape of the North Carolina economy at the time.167 As 
Harvard Economics Professor Andrei Shleifer and University of 
Chicago Business Professor Robert Vishny explained in their article, 
Takeovers in the ‘60s and the ‘80s: Evidence and Implications,168 the 
takeover targets in the 1980s wave were generally much larger 
corporations, such as Fortune 500 companies.169 In fact, twenty-eight 
percent of the Fortune 500 companies of 1980 had been acquired by 
hostile takeover by 1989.170 However during this period, North 
Carolina was experiencing a complete economic overhaul.171 It was 
not until the late 1980s that North Carolina’s economy began to shift 
away from smaller companies engaged in the textile and farming 
industries towards much larger companies in the financial and 
technology-based industries.172 
Thus, it is quite possible that the North Carolina General 
Assembly was disinclined to follow the constituency statute trend that 
began in the mid-1980s simply because the textile and agricultural 
companies that made up a majority of the state’s economy were not 
consistently targeted.173 However, the influx of large corporations in 
the state since the late 1980s has led to a vastly different modern 
economy that is no longer completely dependent upon such 
industries.174 In fact, in 2013, North Carolina had the nation’s tenth 
highest GDP.175 At the center of this growth is the city of Charlotte, 
which has become the second-largest financial center in the country 
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and is now home to many large corporate takeover targets.176 Though 
it may not have made sense for North Carolina to adopt a 
constituency statute in the 1980s, it is clear that the state’s corporate 
landscape has seen significant change over the past thirty-five years, 
and it is imperative that North Carolina revamp its corporate law to 
better reflect this reality.  
Another plausible explanation for North Carolina’s failure to 
adopt either a constituency statute or a benefit corporation act is that 
the general assembly is wary of the effect the statutes may have and 
“want[s] to observe the impact” of constituency statutes and benefit 
corporation acts in other states.177 Regarding constituency statutes in 
particular, North Carolina may have felt that other states were 
“overreacting” by desperately expediting the constituency statutes in 
the face of the 1980s hostile takeover wave.178 If the general assembly 
felt the state could survive the wave of takeovers without passing a 
constituency statute, it would have been to North Carolina’s 
advantage to observe the effect of such statutes in practice in other 
states before deciding whether to adopt one itself. 
Though this argument fails to explain why the general assembly 
still has not ratified a constituency statute over thirty years after the 
nation’s first one was passed, it may explain the house of 
representatives’ reluctance to pass the recent North Carolina Benefit 
Corporation Act, a type of legislation that has only been in existence 
for five years.179 However, by limiting both the scope of its directors’ 
power and the types of business associations it allows to organize in 
the state, North Carolina may be constraining its corporations in a 
way that could negatively impact the state’s economy in the not-so-
distant future by forcing some of these companies to take their 
business elsewhere. 
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IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATE LAW 
GOING FORWARD 
A. Adopt the North Carolina Benefit Corporation Act 
It is imperative that North Carolina recognize the advantages of 
the newest major corporate law reform and ratify a benefit 
corporation act. It is of course true that doing so would not provide 
any clarity as to whether directors of traditional business corporations 
are allowed to consider the interests of nonshareholder constituents, 
like a constituency statute would. However, it would provide an 
attractive alternative business organization option, both for 
entrepreneurs who want to start a company that strives to make a 
profit while “be[ing] about good things” and for existing companies 
willing to commit themselves to a higher standard of social 
accountability.180 
In just five years, twenty-seven jurisdictions have adopted benefit 
corporation acts.181 Though benefit corporations are still very new, 
they have already proven to be a viable business form under which a 
company can satisfy the interests of both its shareholders and 
stakeholders. For example, Patagonia, a well-known outdoor-clothing 
company incorporated in California, amended its articles of 
incorporation to become a benefit corporation just two days after the 
California Benefit Corporation Act became effective in January of 
2012.182 Patagonia’s founder, Yvon Chouinard, is known for his 
environmental philanthropy, and the company had been redirecting a 
portion of its profits to social and environmental causes since 1986, 
despite being classified as an ordinary business corporation.183 
However, by establishing itself as a benefit corporation, the company 
charged its directors with a “legally binding fiduciary responsibility to 
take into account the interests of workers, the community and the 
environment as well as its shareholders,” thus “creat[ing] the legal 
framework” necessary for Patagonia to “remain true to [its] social 
goals.”184 Furthermore, despite Patagonia’s revamped commitment to 
the environment and other nonshareholder constituents, it has 
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managed to remain extremely profitable.185 In fact, since 2008, the 
company has doubled in size and its profits have tripled.186 Though 
benefit corporation acts are still in their adolescence, the success of a 
reputable company like Patagonia suggests that benefit corporations 
may very well be able to achieve both their social and economic goals 
by carrying out their established benefit purposes while still managing 
to produce a healthy bottom line. 
Another important reason for North Carolina to ratify a benefit 
corporation act is that it will allow the state’s corporations to “attract 
and retain talented employees” who “want to work for socially 
conscious companies, and will take less compensation in exchange for 
a greater sense of purpose.”187 In the past, recent college graduates 
who fit this description have often been inclined to work at 
nonprofits.188 However, because the “ability to have an impact on a 
large scale is	.	.	.	greater in the for-profit world,” allowing benefit 
corporations will likely provide a more attractive option for these 
highly qualified workers, thus leading to a more competent and 
efficient work force.189 Similarly, the fact that a company has made a 
commitment to a noble social or environmental cause can be “an 
important selling point with consumers,” thus encouraging them to 
give their business to, or invest in, companies that they otherwise 
would not have.190 Much like benefit corporation investors, who are 
willing to potentially sacrifice a portion of profits, many consumers 
are willing to pay slightly more for goods and services provided by 
socially and environmentally responsible corporations because they 
realize that doing so will help further social causes.191 
In short, adopting a benefit corporation act in North Carolina 
will likely result in both a more efficient supply chain and increased 
consumer demand.192 By creating a sustainable model in which a 
corporation makes a commitment to conduct its business for the 
benefit of its shareholders, as well as its employees and the 
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environment, companies like Patagonia have blazed the trail for 
socially conscious corporations with similar aspirations. 
One final reason to pass a benefit corporation act in North 
Carolina is that it would provide both the courts and the would-be 
directors of benefit corporations with substantial legal clarity. By 
creating a duty that requires benefit corporation directors to consider 
nonshareholder constituents, benefit corporation acts make clear that 
a company is bound to uphold its stated benefit purposes even “when 
times get tough.”193 Furthermore, by providing shareholders with 
clearly defined and enforceable legal rights, benefit corporation acts 
establish an important check on the board’s power that assures this 
important duty will be followed.194 In turn, the unambiguous 
provisions of benefit corporation acts leave little room for alternative 
interpretation, foreseeably easing the North Carolina courts’ burden 
should they be required to interpret the meaning of the statute in 
future litigation.195 
Though the North Carolina General Assembly has thus far 
declined to adopt a benefit corporation act, there is still hope for 
ratification of such a statute in the near future. After rejecting the 
proposed legislation in May of 2013, the house of representatives 
immediately decided to resurrect the bill by reversing the vote on a 
motion for reconsideration by Sen. Tim Moore.196 The bill has since 
been referred again to the house commerce committee for further 
consideration.197 Passing the bill would create a new type of legal 
business association with mandatory director duties and clearly 
defined shareholder rights of enforcement.198 In addition, it would 
foster a more efficient economy with a highly qualified workforce that 
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would allow benefit corporations to appease shareholder and 
nonshareholder constituents alike. 
B. Enact a Constituency Statute 
Though adopting a benefit corporation act would prove valuable 
to North Carolina in many ways, doing so would not solve the 
corporate identity conflict in the context of traditional business 
corporations. Because North Carolina has yet to adopt a constituency 
statute and the case law fails to clearly fill the statutory gap, one can 
only assume that the state still conforms to the traditionalist 
“property” school of thought.199 Accordingly, the shareholder primacy 
theory requires directors of North Carolina corporations to operate in 
a way that maximizes shareholder profits and considers only the best 
interests of a corporation’s owners.200 
The current traditionalist theory of corporate identity can deter a 
socially conscious business from incorporating in the state and 
prevent current North Carolina corporations from fully developing 
their “moral identity.”201 The first major benefit of adopting a 
constituency statute is that it would remove the burden caused by a 
North Carolina corporation director’s duty to maximize shareholder 
profit, instead allowing directors to make decisions that benefit the 
corporation as a whole.202 While in actuality directors probably 
manage to escape liability for decisions that involve the consideration 
of nonshareholder interests on a fairly regular basis,203 the fact 
remains that, under current North Carolina law, such actions 
constitute a breach of fiduciary duty for which the shareholders are 
legally entitled to sue.204 Adopting a constituency statute in North 
Carolina would provide explicit immunity for directors of nonbenefit 
corporations, thus encouraging open and consistent consideration of 
stakeholder interests as part of the board’s decision-making 
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process.205 And without such liability on a corporation’s directors, the 
corporation can develop a strong “moral identity” within its 
community and uphold what many consider to be its implied ethical 
obligations.206 
Another significant benefit of adopting a constituency statute is 
that its adoption would make North Carolina’s corporate law more 
consistent with the modern theory of the corporation in the United 
States, as exemplified by corporate law trends in a vast majority of the 
states.207 By allowing directors to formally recognize the interests of 
all those who sustain the corporation through important noncapital 
investments, North Carolina would be “recogniz[ing] both the 
inextricable interdependence of corporate actors and the desirability 
of treating participants in a common enterprise as if they share 
common goals, rather than placing them in selfish competition with 
one another.”208 In doing so, the general assembly would align the 
state’s corporate law with the modern constructionist theory of 
corporate identity embraced by nearly all other states.209 
Further, operating under the constructionist theory and 
considering the interests of the corporate entity as a whole rather 
than just those of the shareholders would allow directors to maximize 
the long-term wealth-producing value of the firm.210 The fact that an 
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investor’s shares in a company are almost always freely transferable 
means that the general interests of the corporation’s shareholders will 
frequently change, depending upon the age and level of risk aversion 
of the particular shareholders at any given time.211 Because “[a] 
corporation is an entity whose interests will generally remain the 
same over an extended period of time	.	.	.	a more consistent result will 
come from pursuing the goals of a corporate entity rather than 
seeking to satisfy the constantly changing, volatile goals of 
shareholders.”212 
In summary, adopting a constituency statute in North Carolina 
would “attract socially responsible businesses” not already 
incorporated in the state213 and would provide directors of those that 
are with the legal immunity necessary to consider nonshareholder 
interests more openly and consistently.214 The ratification of a 
constituency statute would also make the state’s body of corporate 
law more consistent with the modern theory of the corporation.215 
Current North Carolina corporate law seemingly fails to recognize the 
value of the nonfinancial investments that stakeholders make in a 
company, instead placing all the value on the capital investments 
provided by its shareholders.216 Many scholars like Edward Adams 
and John Matheson, both business law professors at the University of 
Minnesota School of Law, refute this theory of the corporation, 
asserting that nonshareholder constituents, like employees, actually 
“may have made a much greater investment in the enterprise by their 
years of service, may have less ability to withdraw, and may have a 
greater stake in the future of the enterprise than many of the 
stockholders.”217 Adopting a constituency statute in North Carolina 
would allow directors to recognize the interests of all those invested 
in the corporation and would lead to a more efficient and cooperative 
corporate model.218 
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CONCLUSION 
Corporate identity theory has come a long way since the early 
1920s, when state courts consistently held that directors’ sole duty was 
to maximize shareholder profits, even if doing so was to the detriment 
of other stakeholders’ interests.219 Since then, many states have 
abandoned the outdated, traditionalist shareholder primacy model in 
favor of an all-inclusive, constructionist corporate identity theory 
through the passage of socially progressive corporate law 
legislation.220 In doing so, these states have responded to the need for 
a more equitable corporate model that considers the interest of all 
parties who have made investments in a corporation, whether 
financial or otherwise.221 It is time for North Carolina to follow this 
trend and pass some progressive corporate laws of its own. 
Enacting a benefit corporation act would encourage socially and 
environmentally responsible corporations to incorporate in the state. 
These corporations would then be able to attract and retain young, 
talented employees who are determined to pursue careers that will 
make a difference in the world, as well as socially conscious 
consumers who are committed to supporting these companies’ 
beneficial purposes. A benefit corporation act would also provide 
substantial legal clarity to the directors of benefit corporations and 
enable them to hold corporations to higher social standards. 
Additionally, adopting a constituency statute would permit 
directors of nonbenefit corporations to consider the interests of 
nonshareholder constituents by freeing them from legal liability for 
failure to maximize shareholder profits. By embracing the 
constructionist corporate model, a constituency statute in North 
Carolina would allow directors to maximize the long-term wealth-
producing value of the corporation by recognizing the important 
nonfinancial investments made by a corporation’s many stakeholders. 
While the objective of a for-profit corporation is ultimately to 
have a healthy bottom line, directors should not be forced to 
completely disregard the interests of nonshareholder constituents in 
pursuit of that goal. Allowing for benefit corporations and providing 
directors of nonbenefit corporations with the ability to consider 
stakeholder interests would lead to a more efficient economy in 
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North Carolina and would make North Carolina corporate law much 
more consistent with the prevailing modern theory of the corporation. 
It is time the state steps into the future by abandoning the 
traditionalist school of thought and joining the constructionist reform 
movement. 
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